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Abstract
In a previous publication I showed that counterfactuals grounded in decision making
can be given interpretation in terms “imaging” – a process of “mass-shifting” among
possible worlds. This paper elaborates on this interpretation and shows the converse:
imaging can be given an interpretation in terms of a stochastic decision policy in which
agents choose actions with certain probabilities. This mapping, from the metaphys-
ical to the physical, should be helpful in assessing whether metaphysically-inspired
extensions of current interventional theories are warranted in a given decision making
situation.
1 Introduction - Physical and Metaphysical Concep-
tions of Actions
The traditional accounts of causal decision theory (CDT), most notably those developed
by Stalnaker (1972); Lewis (1973); Gardenfors (1988) and Joyce (1999), oﬀer what we
might call a metaphysical view of counterfactuals, where “possible worlds,” “similarity”
and “weight shifting” are the basic concepts. In contrast, the structural account of
counterfactuals (Pearl, 2000) takes the physical notions of “mechanisms”, “variables”,
“measurements” and “interventions” as the basic primitives. This paper deals with the
relationships between the two accounts.
If the options available to an agent are speciﬁed in terms of their immediate consequences
(as in “make him laugh,” “paint the wall red,” “raise taxes” or, in general, do(X = x), then
a rational agent is instructed to maximize the expected utility
EU(x) =
X
y
Px(y)U(y) (1)
over all options x. Here, U(y) stands for the utility of outcome Y = y and Px(y) – the focus
of this paper - stands for the (subjective) probability that outcome Y = y would prevail,
had action do(X = x) been performed and condition X = x ﬁrmly established.
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inappropriate for serving in Eq. (1), for it leads to paradoxical results of several kinds (see
(Skyrms, 1980; Pearl, 2000, pp. 108–9)). For example, patients would avoid going to the
doctor to reduce the probability that one is seriously ill; barometers would be manipulated
to reduce the likelihood of storms; doctors would recommend a drug to male and female
patients, but not to patients with undisclosed gender, and so on. Yet the question of what
function should substitute for Px(y), despite decades of thoughtful debates (Jeﬀrey, 1965;
Harper et al., 1981; Cartwright, 1983) seems to still baﬄe philosophers in the 21st century
(Weirich, 2008; Arlo-Costa, 2007).
Guided by ideas from structural econometrics (Haavelmo, 1943; Strotz and Wold,
1960),1 I have explored and axiomatized a conditioning operator called do(x) (Pearl,
1995) that captures the intent of Px(y) by simulating an intervention in a causal model of
interdependent variables (Pearl, 2009).
The idea is simple. To model an action do(X = x) one performs a “mini-surgery” on the
causal model, that is, a minimal change necessary for establishing the antecedent X = x,
while leaving the rest of the model intact. This calls for removing the mechanism (i.e.,
equation) that nominally assigns values to variable X, and replacing it with a new equation,
X = x, that enforces the intent of the speciﬁed action. One important feature of this
formulation is that P(y|do(x)) can be derived from pre-interventional probabilities provided
one possesses a diagrammatic representation of the processes that govern variables in the
domain (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 2001). Speciﬁcally the post-intervention probabilities
reads:2
P(x,y,z|do(X = x
∗)) =
(
P(x,y,z)/P(x|z) if x = x∗
0 if x 6= x∗ (2)
Here z stands for any realization of the set Z of “past” variables, y is any realization of the
set Y of “future” variables, and “past” and “future” refer to the occurrence of the action
event X = x∗.3
The philosophical literature spawned a totally diﬀerent perspective on the probability
function Px(y) in (1). In a famous letter to David Lewis, Robert Stalnaker (1972)
suggested to replace conditional probabilities with probabilities of conditionals, i.e.,
Px(y) = P(x > y)), where (x > y) stands for counterfactual conditional “Y would be y if
X were x.” ——end ref. ——– Using a “closest worlds” semantics, Lewis (1973) deﬁned
P(x > y) using a probability-revision operation called “imaging,” in which probability
mass “shifts” from worlds to worlds, governed by a measure of “similarity”. Whereas Bayes
conditioning P(y|x) transfers the entire probability mass from worlds excluded by X = x to
1These were brought to my attention by Peter Spirtes in 1991.
2The relation between Px and P takes a variety of equivalent forms, including the back-door formula,
truncated factorization, adjustment for direct causes, or the inverse probability weighing shown in (2) (Pearl,
2000, pp. 72–3). I chose the latter form, because it is the easiest to motivate without appealing to graphical
notation.
3I will use “future” and “past” ﬁguratively; “aﬀected” and “unaﬀected” (by X) are more accurate tech-
nically (i.e., descendants and nondescendants of X, in graphical terminology). The derivation of (2) requires
that processes be organized recursively (avoiding feedback loops); more intricate formulas apply to non-
recursive models. See Pearl (2009, pp. 72–3) or Spirtes et al. (2001) for a simple derivation of this and
equivalent formulas.
2all remaining worlds, in proportion to the latters’ prior probabilities P(w), imaging works
diﬀerently; each excluded world w transfers its mass individually to a select set of worlds
Sx(w) that are considered “closest” to w among those satisfying X = x (see Fig. 1). Joyce
(1999) used the “\” symbol, as in P(y\x), to denote the probability resulting from such
imaging process.
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Figure 1: Weight shifting in Bayesian (a) and imaging (b) conditionalizations.
In (Pearl, 2000, p. 73) I have shown that the transformation deﬁned by the do(x)
operator, Eq. (2), can be interpreted as an imaging-type mass-transfer, if the following two
provisions are met.
Provision 1 - the choice of “similarity” measure is not arbitrary; worlds with equal
histories should be considered equally similar to any given world.
Provision 2 - the re-distribution of weight within each selection set Sw) is not arbitrary
either, equally-similar worlds should receive mass in proportion to their prior probabilities.
This tie-breaking rule is similar in spirit to the Bayesian policy,4
Regardless of how we deﬁne “similarity”, the Bayesian tie-breaking rule (Provision 2)
permits us to write a general expression for the probability function P(w\x) that results
from imaging on x. It reads:
P(w\x) =
X
w0
P(w
0)P(w|Sx(w
0)) (3)
This compact formula, adopted from Joyce (2009), is applicable to any selection function
Sx(w) and gives the ﬁnal weight P(w\x) of both excluded and preserved worlds w.5
4Joyce (2009) labeled this mass transfer policy, “Bayesianized imaging,” and noted that it violates a
tacit assumption made in Gardenfors’s proof that imaging should preserve mixtures (Gardenfors, 1988, pp.
108–113).
5This follows from two observations:
S
0
w) = w
0 if w
0 ⇒ X = x
P(w|S
0
w)) = 0 if w ⇒ X 6= x
since any such w is not a member in any S0
w) set.
3Accordingly, for any two propositions A and B we can write:
P(B\A) =
X
w∈B
X
w0
P(w
0)P(w|SA(w
0)
In this paper, I will ﬁrst describe how the post-interventional probability in (2) emerges
from the imaging probability in (3) and then examine a wider class of imaging operations
that give rise to Eq. (2). Using provisions 1 and 2, I will then use imaging to extend the
application of the do(x) operator to a wider set of suppositions, beyond those deﬁned by
the structural model. Finally, I will demonstrate that caution need be exercised when
metaphysical extensions are taken literally, without careful guidance of decision making
considerations.
2 Action as Imaging
To see how Eq. (2) emerges from the mass transfer policy of (3), let us associate a “world”
with a given instantiation of the three sets of variable {X,Y,Z} where X stands for the
action variable in do(X = x), Y stands for variables that are potentially aﬀected by the
action (i.e., descendants of X in the causal graph), and Z stands for all other variables in
the model. A world w then would be a tuple (x,y,z).
Prior to the action, each world is assigned the mass P(x,y,z). After the action
do(X = x∗) is executed, this mass must be re-distributed, since worlds in which X 6= x∗
must be ruled out. The post-action weight of w, P(x,y,z|do(X = x∗)), is equal to the old
weight plus a supplement P(w0 → w) that w receives from some worlds w0 whose mass
vanishes. Aside from satisfying X 6= x∗, each such w0 must consider w to be its “most
similar neighbor,” that is, w must be a member of Sx∗(w0).
According to provision-1 above, worlds in the most-similar set Sx∗(w0) should share with
w0 the entire past (Z = z) up to the point where the action occurs.6 This means that the
supplement weight P(w0 → w) that w receives in the transition comes from each and every
world w0 = (x0,y0,z0) that shares with w = (x,y,z) its z component. The total weight in
those w0 worlds is X
w0|x06=x∗,z0=z
P(w
0) = P(X 6= x
∗,z). (4)
However, w does not receive all the probabilities, P(w0) that w0 is prepared to discharge,
because w is in competition with other z-sharing worlds in the X = x∗ subspace (the space
of surviving worlds). Since weight is distributed in proportion to the competitors prior
weight, the fraction that w receives from each w0 is therefore:
P(w)/
X
y
P(x
∗,y,z
0) = P(x
∗,y,z
0)/P(x
∗,z
0) = P(y|x
∗,z). (5)
6This follows from measuring similarity not by appearance, but rather by the number of mechanism
modiﬁcations (or “miracles”) necessary for establishing X = x∗ (see (Pearl, 2000, p. 239)). Clearly worlds
in which history diﬀers from ours at several points in time require more modiﬁcations than one in which
history remains in tact and only the last mechanism before the action is perturbed.
4Multiplying (4) and (5), the total weight transfered to w from all its w0 contributors is
P(y|x
∗,z)P(X 6= x
∗,z) = P(y|x
∗,z)P(z)(1 − P(x
∗|z))
= P(y|x
∗,z)P(z) − P(x
∗,y,z).
and adding to this w’s original weight, P(x∗,y,z), we ﬁnally obtain:
P(w\x) = P(y|x
∗,z)P(z)
= P(y,x
∗,z)/P(x
∗|z) (6)
which coincides with Eq. (2).
To summarize, we have established the identity
P(w\x) = P(w|do(x)) (7)
which provides an imaging-grounded justiﬁcation for the inverse-probability weighting that
characterizes the do(x) operator and, conversely, a decision-making justiﬁcation for the
imaging operator.
3 Imaging as an extrapolation principle
It is important to note that the fraction of weight that w receives from w0, P(y|x∗,z), is the
same for any weight-contributing world w0 that sees w as its closest neighbor, for they all
share the same z. This means that the same result would obtain had we not insisted that
each w0 individually delivers its weight to its closest neighbors, but allow instead for all the
z0-sharing w0s to ﬁrst pool their weights together and then deliver that pooled weight onto
the recipients in {w : x = x∗,z = z0} in proportion to their prior weights P(x∗,y,z). There
is in fact no way of telling which way weight is being transferred in the transition, whether
it is accomplished through an individual transfer, as in Fig. 1(a) or through “pooled”
transfer, as in Fig. 1(b).
The reason for this ambiguity lies in the coarseness of the propositions X = x to which
the do(x) operator is applicable. In structural models, such propositions are limited to
elementary instantiations of individual variables, and to conjunctions of such instantiations,
but do not include disjunctions such as do(X = x or Y = y) or do(X 6= x). The structural
deﬁnition, which invokes equation removal, insists on having a unique solution for all
variables, before and after the intervention, and cannot allow therefore for ambiguity in the
form of the disjunction do(X = x or X = x0).
This limitation prevents us from isolating one single world w0 = (x0,y0,z0) and watching
how its weight is being distributed according to Eq. (2). To do so would require us to
compute the distribution P(x,y,z|do(¬x0,¬y0,¬z0)), which is not deﬁnable by the surgery
operation of structural models, since negations cannot be expressed as conjunctions of
elementary propositions X = x, Y = y.
If we take imaging as an organizing principle, more fundamental than the structural
account, we can easily circumvent this limitation and use Eq. (3) together with Provision 1
to compute P(B|do(A)) for any arbitrary propositions A and B. This would give:
P(B|do(A)) =
X
w|w∈B
X
w0
P(w
0)P(w|SA(w
0)) (8)
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Figure 2: Imagining using individual mass transfer (a) and pooled mass transfer (b); the two
are indistinguishable in the structural account.
where SA(w0) is the set of all A-worlds in for which z = z0.
Proponents of metaphysical principles would probably welcome the opportunity to
overcome various limitations of the do(x) operator and extending it with imaging-based
extrapolations, beyond the decision making context for which it was motivated. In (Pearl,
2000, Chapter 7), I indeed used such an extension to interpret counterfactuals with
non-manipulable antecedents. For example, to deﬁne statements such as “She would have
been hired had she not been a female,” in which it is diﬃcult to imagine a physical action
do(female), I proposed the symbolic removal of a ﬁctitious equation Gender = ug; the result
is identical of course to (3). Joyce (2009) has also noted that imaging can answer problems
on which the do(x) operator is silent, and his example (Berkson paradox) falls well within
the structural deﬁnition of non-manipulative counterfactuals (see (Pearl, 2000, p. 206)).
Such extensions, which go from interventional to non-interventional counterfactuals are
fairly safe, for the human mind interprets the two types of sentences through the same
mental machinery. The interpolation proposed in (8) however is of diﬀerent character, for
it assigns a concrete formal interpretation to disjunctive action do(A or B) for which no
structural deﬁnition exists. In the next section I will argue that such extensions should be
approached with caution; limitations imposed by structural models are there for a reason –
the keep us tuned to physical reality and to the agents operating in that reality.
64 Imaging and Disjunctive Actions
Assume we are given three variables, X = {x1,x2,x3},Y = {y1,y2},Z = {z1,z2} such that
X is aﬀected by Z and Y is aﬀected by both X and Z, as shown in Fig. 3. We wish to
Z z1 z2
(     ,      )
X x1 x2 x3
(     ,     ,     )
Y y1 y2
(     ,      )
Figure 3: Given P(x,y,z), ﬁnd P(y1|do(x2 or x3)).
compute P(y1|do(x2 or x3)) from the prior probability P(x,y,z), but since do(x2 or x3) is
not deﬁned, we resort to P(y1\x2 or x3) instead, as given in (8).
Following the derivation in Section 3 we know that, in every Z = z stratum, each
of the four surviving worlds {(x,y,z) : x ∈ (x2,x3),y ∈ (y1,y2)} receives a fraction
P(x,y,z)/P(X 6= x1,Z = z) of the weight released by the two excluded worlds
{(x
0,y
0,z
0) : x
0 = x1,y
0 ∈ {y1,y2},z
0 = z}
The ﬁnal mass in each surviving world will therefore be:
P(x,y,z\x2 or x3) = P(x,y,z)/P((x2 or x3)|z)
= P(x,y,z)/[P(x2|z) + P(x3|z)] (9)
strongly reminiscent of the inverse probability formula of the standard do(x) operator (Eq.
(2)), and amounts to Bayesian conditioning in each stratum of Z.
To compute our target quantity, we sum over z and obtain:
P(y1\x2 or x3) =
X
z
P(y1,z,x2 or x3)/P(x2 or x3|z)
=
X
z
P(z)[P(y1|z,x2)P(x2|z) + P(y1|z,x3)P(x3|z)]/[P(x2|z) + P(x3|z)]
(10)
This formula can be given a simple interpretation in terms of a stochastic intervention
policy: An agent instructed to perform the action do(x2 or x3) ﬁrst observes the value of Z,
then chooses either action do(x2) or do(x3) with probability ratio P(x2|z)(x3|z).
We see that the interpretation engendered by imaging reﬂects a commitment to speciﬁc
interventional policy that may or may not be compatible with the intent of the action
do(x2 or x3).
In the next section we will see that the silence of the structural theory vis a vis
disjunctive actions is not a sign of weakness but rather a wise warning to potential
ambiguity that deserves the attention of rational agents.
75 Restaurants and Taxi Drivers in the service of
Imaging
Consider the sentence:
“The food was terrible, we should have asked the taxi driver to drop us at any
of the other two restaurants in town.”
Let the proposition X = xi, i = 1,2,3 stand for “eating at the ith restaurant”, and let
Y = y1 stand for “ﬁne food.” Assume that the quality of the various restaurants is encoded
by the conditional probability P(y|x), with x ∈ (x1,x2,x3),y ∈ (y1,y2). We ask whether
the imaging interpretation of P(y|do(x2 or x3)) (Eqs. (3), (7), or (10)) would provide an
adequate evaluation of the sentence above.
The ﬁrst question to ask is whether the information available is suﬃcient for calculating
the probability of being dropped oﬀ at restaurant x2 (similarly, x3) were we to instruct
the driver to avoid restaurant x1. The structural theory says: no, and the imaging theory
says: yes. The former argues that the answer we seek is highly sensitive to the process that
determines X, the choice of restaurant, and that there is nothing in the information at
hand that dictates how a taxi driver would behave once her space of options shrinks from
three to two alternatives. The imaging theorist argues that it is highly unlikely (though
possible) that a driver who prefers x2 to x3 when three options are available would change
her preference under two options. Therefore, in the absence of information to the contrary,
we should appeal to Eq. (3) and, since all worlds are equally similar (i.e., sharing the same
past, Z = {0},) (9) leads us to the Bayesian solution:
P(x2|do(x2 or x3)) = P(x2|x2 or x3) = P(x2)/[P(x2) + P(x3)] (11)
which preserves not only preferences but ratios as well.7
The structural theorist is not happy with this solution, and claims that, even if we
assume “ratio preservation” under shrinking options, that does not guarantee proper
evaluation of the hypothetical P(y|do(x2 or x3)) because, even if ratios are preserved by
every individual taxi driver, they may not be preserved in probability. To back up this
claim he presents a numerical example, showing that, two diﬀerent assumptions about
drivers’ behavior, both consistent with the information available, produce drastically
diﬀerent values for P(x2|do(x2 or x3)).
Suppose there are two types of taxi drivers in town. Type 1, designated Z = z1, drop
all customers at restaurant x3 i.e.,
P(x|z1) =
(
1 if x = x3
0 otherwise
(12)
7Note that both theories agree that, in principle, Bayesian conditionalization is inadequate for evaluating
the probability sought in our story. The reason being that Bayesian conditionalization represents indicative
conditionals (e.g., knowing that we were not dropped of at restaurant x1, how likely is it that we will end
up eating at x2) while our conditional is subjunctive (e.g., if we were to avoid x1) or interventional (e.g.,
if we forbade the driver from x1). The imaging analyst, however is willing to compromise, arguing that, if
Bayesianized imaging works for deﬁnitive action, it should work for disjunctive action as well.
8Type 2 drivers, designated Z = z2, are not on the payroll of restaurant x3, and follow the
following pattern:
P(x|z2) =

 
 
8/9 if x = x1
1/9 if x = x2
0 otherwise
(13)
10% of taxi drivers are of type 1 and 90% of type 2, thus P(z1) = 0.1 = 1 − P(z2),
Accordingly, the prior probabilities for X calculate to:
P(x) =
X
z
P(x|z)P(z)
=

 
 
0.80 for x = x1
0.10 for x = x2
0.10 for x = x3
(14)
and the Bayesian answer gives equal probabilities to restaurants x2 and x3:
P(x2|x2 or x3) = 0.50
P(x3|x2 or x3) = 0.50 (15)
On the other hand, if imaging is applied, Eq. (10) gives a 9 to 1 preference to restaurant
x2:
P(x2|do(x2 or x3) =
X
z
P(z)P(x2|z)/P(x2 or x3|z)
=
X
z
P(z)[P(x2|z)/[P(x2|z) + P(x3|z)] (16)
= 0.90
while
P(x3|do(x2 or x3) = 0.10
This proves, claims the structural analyst, that contrary to Eq. (11), P(x) tells us
nothing about which restaurant we are likely to end up in if we allow each driver to
follow her own preferences and average over all drivers. What started with as equal prior
probabilities (Eqs. 14–15) turns out to be a 9:1 preference, just by explicating the behavior
of each driver. (Reversal of probability ratios is of course easy to demonstrate by assuming,
for example P(z1) = 0.20). This drastic change will be reﬂected in the expected food
quality P(y1|do(x2 or x3). Even if we assume that Y is independent of Z conditional on X,
the fact that P(x2|do(x2 or x3)) depends so critically on the distribution of driver types,
amounts to saying that the information available is insuﬃcient for calculating the target
quantity. Yet imaging commits to the Bayesian answer (11) if we are not given P(x|z).
Such sensitivity does not occur in the calculation of non-disjunctive interventions like
9P(y1|do(x2)); regardless of the story about taxi drivers and their preferences, as long as we
average over types, we get the same answer
P(y1|do(x2)) = P(y1|x2).
The imaging analyst replies that, while he appreciates the warning that the structural
theory gives to decision makers, imaging is an epistemic theory and, as such, it views
sensitivity to mechanisms as a virtue, not a weakness. If an agent truly believes the story
about the two types of taxi drivers, it is only rational that the agent also believes in the 9:1
probability ratio. If, on the other hand, the agent has no basis for supposing this story over
other conspiratorial theories, the Bayesian answer is the best one can expect.
There is nothing new in sensitivity to processes, argues the imaging analyst, it is
commonplace even in the structural context. We know, for example, that the probability
of causation (i.e., the probability that Y would be diﬀerent had X been diﬀerent (Pearl,
2000)) is sensitive to the mechanism underlying the data. Yet the structural theory does
not proclaim this probability “undeﬁned.” On the contrary, it considers it well-deﬁned
in fully speciﬁed models, and “unidentiﬁed” in a partially speciﬁed models, where some
aspects of the underlying mechanisms are not known. In contrast, counterfactuals with
disjunctive antecedents are deemed “undeﬁned” even in fully speciﬁed structural models.
Here, the structural analyst replies that disjunctive counterfactuals are deﬁned, albeit
in the form of an interval, with
P(y|do(x2 or x3)) ∈ [P(y|do(x2)),P(y|do(x3))]
and, if one insists on obtaining a deﬁnitive value for P(y|do(x2 or x3)), a fully-speciﬁed
model should take into account how each agent reacts to shrinking options – the Bayesian
assumption that probability ratios should be preserved by default, at the population level,
is utterly ad hoc.
The conversation would probably not end here, but the paper must.
6 Conclusions
The structural account of actions and counterfactuals provides a decision theoretic
justiﬁcation for two provisions associated with imaging operations: (i) worlds with
equal histories should be deemed equally similar, and (ii) ties are broken in a Bayesian
fashion. Extending these provisions beyond the context of decision making led to plausible
interpretation of non-manipulative counterfactuals using either the structural or the
possible-worlds accounts. However, extensions to disjunctive actions were shown to require
assumptions that one may not be prepared to make in any given situation. This paper
explicates some of these assumptions and helps clarify the relationships between the
structural and imaging accounts of counterfactuals.
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